The title of this blog site reflects a long-standing
interest in notions of plasticity which has several sources. But before I mention those, I should say why
I think the notion of plasticity is important, or at least interesting. The idea of plasticity is about the human capacity
to change, a capacity which is not, however, infinite. As philosopher Catherine Malabou argues (What Should We Do With Our Brain?),
plasticity is not some completely amorphous malleability. In other words, if you and I have natures
that are plastic, that means that they can change, but it does not mean that
they are simply passive receptacles for whatever influences befall us or whatever
disciplines are imposed on us. Rather,
as Malabou suggests, plasticity invokes the thought of (plastic)
explosives. Our particular identities,
along with our human nature itself, contain within themselves surprising and
world-transforming resources that make them “agential” or active rather than
simply passive.
Why is that important?
I suggest it is because if we have a human nature that does not simply
adapt to external circumstances but contains within itself its own dynamism,
then that which makes us human inevitably pushes back again regimes of
domination or discipline (including, for the theologically minded among you,
sin). But of course, it doesn’t push
back for the sake of an aimless freedom.
That’s the other side of plasticity.
To say that we have a plastic nature is still to say that we have a
nature: there are some types of things that are fulfilling (classically, we
call them “goods”) and others that, while perhaps enjoyable, are ultimately
stultifying (“evils”). Plasticity can
take from classical Christian natural law tradition the notion of natural human
ends, without making them static and inflexible. It is a historicized way of interpreting
human nature, in other words: we have
ends that are natural to us, but those ends are the products of a history that
is still moving. That is to say, what is good and what is evil for us can actually change--not just because of changing contexts, but also because of changing ways in which we are put together. "Tastes" are a good, if superficial, example: green beans taste good to me as an adult, and thus they are not only good for my health but they are now an aesthetic good as well. I take it that worship practices in churches may also serve to illustrate this. Music that once affected us one way (say, awe-inspiring) now affects us in another (say, comfort-inducing). Both, we might say, are good, but we can enter into a conversation about what good is better (or whether the lesser good may actually be a kind of evil!), given the ends of corporate worship as we now understand them.
So what are the sources for (my own) thinking about human
plasticity? First, the plasticity of the
brain, or neuroplasticity. We now know a
couple of very important things about human nature. First, it is an expression of the workings of
an enormously complex network of neurons that make up the central nervous
system. Whatever we identify as “natural”
for human beings in terms of behaviors, desires, or inclinations will be
represented by some set of neural pathways.
But second, and more importantly, these pathways are never completely “hardwired.” In other words, the connections between
neurons that form the basis of who we are both in general (human nature) and in
particular (personal identity) are susceptible of change. The brain, we have
learned, constantly rewires itself, as new connections are formed in response
to new experiences. This means that new
desires can be created, or new associations between certain external stimuli
and certain internal motivations can emerge.
This is largely how advertising in a consumer-driven economy works—we have
to learn to want new things. But, thankfully, since it is a matter of the brain
re-wiring itself (recall Malabou’s point) rather than being simply re-wired by
external forces, we have agency, and responsibility, even here.
A second source is quite different. I am indebted to Kathryn Tanner (Christ the Key) for putting me on to
this one: Gregory of Nyssa’s account of human nature as indeterminately open. Tanner actually uses the word “plasticity” to
describe Gregory’s argument that human nature is to have no nature. For Gregory,
as created in God’s image we human beings are oriented toward the infinite. Nothing finite satisfies our desire for God,
but we can “fill” ourselves with creaturely preoccupations so that that desire
is stifled. What we choose to fill
ourselves with, according to Gregory, is what constitutes our nature. We either become entangled in sin, and
consequent mortality, or we become divinized.
On the face of it, Gregory’s account is surely an exaggeration: to say in effect that we choose our nature
flies in the face of what we now know about the evolutionary origins of human
beings, but also of what we have long known on the basis of human
experience. But this is where Tanner’s
use of the idea of “plasticity” is interesting, especially if we give it a
Malabouan twist. Perhaps it is best to
interpret Gregory’s point as saying that the nature of human beings is to have
a desire for the infinite, a desire that is productive and not simply
passive. As Calvin urged much latter,
the human heart is a factory of gods.
The desire for the infinite bursts through mundane, utilitarian calculations
about the use values of objects and invests some thing or things with ultimacy. But, not letting Gregory’s point get
swallowed, it is not a matter of indifference which objects are so
invested. If the “idol” is worshiped,
our brains are wired accordingly and we come to desire the wrong things, things
that do not satisfy and do not keep us open to the infinite. If the “icon” (drawing this distinction from
Jean-Luc Marion) is revered, then we are constantly ushered into the open
spaces of eternity, because it is the nature of the icon not to allow our
vision to rest upon it but to point beyond itself. So, our plasticity has to do with our
primordial openness to the infinite and also with the dependency of that
openness upon objects of attention that do not close it. Thus there are both active and passive
components to plasticity: a desire and a
dependence; a transcendence and a creaturely limitation; an indeterminacy and a
boundedness.
This duality (not dualism!) has to do not only with religious
artifacts and ritual practices, but also with economic, social, and political
transactions. Our plasticity means that
it is in our capacity to resist foreclosure of our relations to God and neighbor,
to push back against stultification of our natures in the invisible hands of
cruel, inhuman market forces, but also that we need mechanisms and institutions
within which to live in order to preserve and to realize the possibilities for
true human flourishing. We need
education, and systems of distribution, and functional political processes, or
else the resplendence of the idols becomes all too glaring, and we are lured
into the darkness of a gilded age.
Plasticity, as I understand it, is an account of the freedom
of the human creature before God—not unlimited, not arbitrary, but also dynamic
rather than static. I’ve left a number
of loose threads here, but this gives an idea at least of why I think it is
important that we human beings are plastic people.
Great stuff! I really like the way you work with Malabou to interpret Tanner/Gregory of Nyssa. From my perspective you are expanding on the work of R. Niebuhr (human's as finite and free) with more subtle concepts. Here you appeal to taste as an example of an agent's change. It would be interesting to see a more substantive example. What of RN and birth control?
ReplyDeleteOne worry. If sin = being stifled, then virtue = change? I know this is not what you intend, but...
A second worry, do you have room for a positive account of human nature that is without intention?
Both worries are simply me being impatient and wanting to read more. I may have also read to quickly.
Thanks!
dave